

Nov 2, 1962

Dear Mr. President:

I know that, as the situation now stands, you do not consider the Cuban crisis as settled and I am certain that you realize, more than anybody else, what remains to be accomplished for a real settlement. I want, however, to stress how essential what you have already obtained seems to me.

Locally, at least for a certain time, the new and immediate threat which had appeared, on the south flank of your country, will perhaps disappear. As for the world situation, the Soviet withdrawal, even if it were calculate and temporary, is bound to have important consequences.

It is true that France did not think she should intervene directly in this crisis. Besides, the US did not ask her to do so, though she was continually kept informed of the facts. In this respect, you may be assured that I have very much appreciated the information contained in the messages you have sent me. But, I must repeat to you that if the local conflict about Cuba had caused or should cause a world war, either directly or through a crisis in Europe, France would have been, or would be, in any case, and thoroughly, at the side of America.

Anyhow, it is thanks to the resolution that has been shown by the US, and first of all, by yourself, Mr. President, that the advantage you have obtained was achieved. As for us, and you that, I have never doubted that, in the state of the relations between the Free World and the Soviet World, firmness must be, for all of us, the constant basis of our attitude. I repeat this today having in mind, among other things, what might happen, suddenly, about Berlin.

It is only when our refusal to compromise, in spite of whatever pressures, temptations or threats, will have multiplied the disappointments for Moscow that a chance of a general easing of tension will appear, and after that, the possibility of a real negotiation for a "modus vivendi" in all the regions of the world.

Please accept, dear Mr. President, the assurances of my highest and friendly consideration.

C. de Gaulle

M.. Mais je dois vous redire que si le conflit local au sujet de Cuba avait entraîné ou devait entraîner la guerre mondiale, soit directement soit par le détour d'une crise en Europe, la France eut été, ou serait, en tout cas entièrement, aux côtés de l'Amérique.

... C'est seulement quand notre refus de compromettre, malgré n'importe quelles pressions, ou tentations, ou menaces, aura multiplié les déboires de Moscou, que pourra apparaître une chance de détente générale et, ensuite, la possibilité d'une réelle négociation pour un "modus vivendi" dans toutes les régions du monde.

Oct 28 (?)

Memo to Nitze  
from HSR (?)

1. US + NATO have interest in localizing this dispute.

2. Must try to prevent (so arbitration action of limited character - perhaps non-military attack on Turkish industry) from developing into general nuclear war. The current proposal for so doing is to have the US propose to Italy + the NAC that the Turkish I's be disarmed.

3. Alternatives:

a. US explain possibility of reprisal raid.

b. Name another country, possibly Germany, Norway or Denmark, propose that I's in Italy (+ possibly Italy) be disarmed.

c. US brief: 1) Cuban missiles threat to NATO strategic deterrent; 2) disarming of Turkish I's will not affect NATO strategic power; 3) reprisal raid by low

Bundzy questions:

20. What would we have done differently? How did election figure in Administration statement responses, recon, dissemination, ?
21. Why wasn't recon increased from July in view of: a) SU buildup; peculiar features: size, pace, SU personnel (how were these read?); b) McCone; d) commitment to surveillance; e) bad weather; f) imminent loss of overhead recon?
22. How could K have improved his chances?
23. Have procedures of SG changed since Cuba?
24. What thinking had been done by SG, Pres, on what we might do--and how effective it might be--prior to Sept 14, 13 statements, or between Sept 20--Oct 16?
25. What if K had not gotten out, or shot more planes, Sunday morning? Chances of initiative on trade? Arguments against trade, Saturday night?
26. Interpretation of F-S; (other? RFK-Dob, Thompson-Dob?) Friday night letter; Saturday morning letter.
27. Expectations of effect of ultimatum. Interpretation of shootdown. Attitude toward political track as of Saturday afternoon.
28. What surprised Khrushchev during crisis; why? What did he expect?
29. What surprised ExComm members during crisis; any of their own or each others' reactions? Allied reactions? Continued SU deception? SU backdown?  
How well would our own moves have been foreseen earlier? e.g., Presidential choices.
30. Intelligence process in retrospect. Sensitivity over recon incidents; restrictions on dissemination (good?); skepticism toward McCone, agents, refugees; confidence in SI; assumptions on speed on Sov~~u~~ movements;
31. Private channel in retrospect: before crisis.
32. Had we "overcommunicated" a concern for legality (were they too reassured by the legality of their actions and the illegality of ours?): i.e., had we failed to communicate conditions under which we would pursue "illegal" action to protect our power and security?

WHAT IF:

1. U-2 overflight of Sakhalin of Aug 30 and Chinat loss of 8 Sept (relative importance of these?) had occurred prior to Aug 29?

*Both after H-2 left.*

- a) flight schedule
- b) conclusions/expectations on SAMs
- c) conclusions on missiles
- d) relative weight to collateral sources
- e) sense of urgency; fever chart of crisis
- f) public assertions, commitments; subsequent response.

2. MR SAMs had not been discovered Aug 29 (because of weather, coverage, etc.):

Impact on: a) disbelief in collateral sources;

b) expectation of missiles

c) willingness to check out later reports of missiles.

3. MRBMs had been discovered sooner, around mid-Sept? (clearly non-operational)  
Impact on: (fewer)

- a) Shock, surprise;
- b) Willingness to attack immediately (higher, because safer, smaller; or less, because less shocking, less threatening?)
- c) Ability to persuade public and Allies of need for 1) independent action; 2) fast action; 3) violent action.
- d) Convergence within ExComm.
- e) Imminence of deadline; effects of longer deadline.

4. MRBMs had been discovered later, or had been installed faster and more completely: warheads, more missiles, complete sites, ~~exempted from~~: a) alert; (b) non-alert.

Impact on:

- a) Relevance of blockade.
- b) Willingness to attack: increased threat vs. increased risk, difficulty, damage.
- c) Increased shock, and effects of this.
- d) Likelihood of fast, early response; and effects of this.

5. JFK had not made public distinction between offensive/defensive? Had not implied commitment to resist offensive?

WHAT IF:

6. If K had made deployment public, and preceded it with reassuring and justifying moves and statements? (including Cuban request, allegations of US aggressive plans, assurance of Sov control, reference to Turkey, freedom of seas...)
  - a) Reaction of Allies, public; OAS.
  - b) Effect of move, if successful, on SU bargaining improvement over Berlin. (IF US had acquiesced, it would be under Allied pressure, lack of Sov deception or immediate threat, no explicit JFK commitment; no shock or panic reaction in fall '62;
  - c) Effect on domestic politics (lacking period of allegation and denial, JFK commitments).
7. K had, prior to Oct 22, leaked facts and reassurances to US Allies, e.g., Britain?
8. K had given no grounds for charging deception? K had actually informed JFK privately?
9. Keating and others had not charged presence of missiles? Presence of buildup?
10. Deployment had taken place in 1961, prior to exposure of Missile Gap? After exposure of Missile Gap?
11. After Castro had exposed, denounced U-2 flights prior to Aug 29? After Aug 29? Activated SAMs? Fired SAM? Shot down U-2?

WHAT DIFFERENCES COULD HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE TO:

1. ✓ 1. K's expectations of US response: a) prior to decision; b) prior to July 62; c) prior to mid-Sept 62; d) prior to Oct 22?
2. US interpretation of SU motives.
3. US expectation of SU response to various US counteractions.
4. US willingness to blockade; b) to follow blockade with attack; c) to precede blockade by attack.
5. Chance that Sov move would trigger an unwarned US strike.
6. JFK willingness to commit himself to resist offensive deployment.
7. Allied acceptance of US: a) failure to consult  
b) failure to inform earlier  
c) proposed course of action  
d) more violent action  
e) trades, if proposed
8. K's degree of belief in JFK's public commitments: in general; regarding Cuba.
9. US willingness to blockade (e.g., belief that deployment was ~~xxxxx~~ complete? Prior Allied knowledge? Sov threats--to US, public, Allies? UN attitude? OAS acceptance?)
10. JFK's feeling of having been deceived by K.
11. US willingness to overfly at all, Sept-Oct 62?
12. US disbelief that Sovs would move in MRBMs.

How could K have gotten away with it?

WHAT COULD KHRUSHCHEV HAVE DONE TO:

- 3 1. Deter overflights between July--Oct 62? Aug-Sept 62?
- 1 2. Prevent JFK from committing US to respond?
- 4 3. Defuse US response between 14--22 Oct.
- 2 4. Delay recognition of missiles and sites by U-2?

reduce his risks?

get away with US inaction  
or blockade, protest; threats; so advance?

How could JFK have convinced K?  
dismayed K?

John Hyland: in EE/ONE (Eastern Europe; SU) 5 June

1. Initial attitudes in CIA estimate, 16-17 Oct.

2. Reaction when told.

3. Interplay with McC (McC certainty; theory; a nut; Rusk reaction)

4. memo over weekend; Kent attitude.

5. Konler interview: acted as if didn't know.

6. Turkey: our base strategic territory, long before missiles put there; in Cuba, SU making free of "our" territory (what if they had created base, waited couple of years; eased in with subs, etc.)

7. Attitude to news of Il-28's; feeling that SU was "testing," faster than expected.

8. SNIE actually drafted last week in Aug (sure SAMS there).  
McC rejected Cuban group SNIE, brought in EE to consider military buildup, possibility of missiles.

9. McC attitude; wrong guesses.

10. Theories of Sov calculation: 1) now accepting big risk; ~~but~~ 2) Underestimating risk; 3) Hyland: desperation, severely pressed by need for improvement (last chance), led to wisful underestimation of risk; 4) (my?) risk not underestimated; but badly played by K, good circumstances for US, good playing by US;

11. Estimates played small role; discredited; worked mainly for McC, didn't influence him much; Pres relied on non-intell advisors and McC for predictions, didn't look to Estimates for predictions, analysis.

12. McC desire to bomb, hawk (eagle); but, prediction (early) of strong SU reaction (bomb Thule) (Berlin, SEAsia, Turkey, Iran) to attack, especially if any Russian soldiers killed; thought gov should prepare.

13. K interview with Gandhi; fake mobilization, deployment, alert. question whether war would have followed.

14. No question put to ONE on effect of action/preparation/ultimatum (through memoto MCC, early, on ultimatum--instead of blockade; thought this would only lead to counterpressure by SU). No tendency to initiate such an estimate. If asked, would probably not have believed in brilliantly effective style of handling.

15. Sovs surprised (Zorin reaction; failure to hedge at all, e.g., to install SAMS before letting us see missiles). Effectiveness of our secrecy; due to what? Very bad "crisis management" by Sovs.

16. Process; special group in ONE; work on estimates; work for McC;

17. Process of producing SNIE, NIE (proposal accepted by Kent; draft; considered by Board; Board member chairman of est, intell comm representatives (e.g., Sonn) aid solicited, conference; USIB

18. Question of asking, in SNIE: 1) But suppose he got away with it, what would it be worth? 2) What would it take for him to get away with it; What might keep us from attacking? (He should have anticipated threats, deployment, etc; should have headed more against possibility)

John Whitman:

1. Process: ONE, BNE, USIB ; amount of coordination; role of DCI.
2. Unprecedented: Rostow panel, assignment of Whitman, sharp split between & DCI and ONE (roles of Harris, Hitchcock; Tidwell?)
3. Issues on SNIE: likelihood of Sov military response; relative likelihood of strong response to invasion, limited military attack.
4. Feeling by 22 Oct on likely Sov response to limited, controlled US response. reaction to blockade proposal.
5. W. reaction to news (tolu, "MCC was right" ) ; prior commitment to position because of MCC producing of Kent.
6. Fear of effect on MCC/ONE.
7. Do analysts get timely, comprehensive info on private, verbal messages to SU? (didn't know about F-S). Do they ask, what tacit info is our whole posture and pattern of behavior and statements affecting opponent's expectations?
- 8.

## The U-2 and the Crisis

1. What was the relative importance of the roles of the photos in:

- a) Convincing intelligence analysts?
- b) Convincing top Presidential advisors?
- c) Convincing the President?
- d) Catching the attention of advisors, President?
- e) Earlier, supporting negative beliefs as to missiles?
- f) Establishing the relative credibility of various informants?
- g) Establishing the need for further information?
- h) Convincing Congress; the press; the public; allies; Soviets; UN.

(Note problem: earlier unsuitability of photographic evidence to convince these critics that missiles were not there; as in Missile Gap crisis.)

(Note McNamara's attempt to use photos in this role, after all, to show that missiles had left; but note the costs of such comprehensive revelations, and limited positive effects).

2. Photos, as information available to a limited group and not outside, create a "data differential" between that group and others including not only the public but the staff of the "elite." This may be reflected in a systematic difference of opinion (e.g., if "outside" group has access to, or is leaked, a part of the information available to elite, e.g., collateral reports or corresponding journalistic sources: Keating), where "elite" is unable to reveal that it has additional information, or what it is. Thus, the difference appears to the critic and to observers as revealing simply a difference in interpretation of the same data, revealing in turn a difference in preconceptions or goals. The photos (or other elite sources) may either negate the other evidence--as prior to Aug. 29, 62 (or ~~in~~ during 1958-60)--or suggest a different interpretation--as between Aug 29 and Oct 14 (SAIS)--or reinforce the other evidence--as after Oct 14. In the first case, the Administration will seem lethargic, inattentive, wishfully negligent, or bound by the inertia of preconceptions, etc--particularly to those who do have access to ~~in~~ opposing data and thus have a claim to be recognized by public as "informed experts" (note legacy of Gaither Committee, particularly ~~in~~ during 1958-60; general position of Congressional critics and non-profit "experts"). There is, in fact, often enough a basis for this charge, and it is difficult for the public to distinguish those cases in which this is not so (especially because security relating to the special information is often kept unusually well).

In latter two cases, Gov may be tempted to release photos to support its case; but if it does not, it can now appear reckless, wishful, too ready to jump to conclusions on insubstantial evidence; fears as ~~in~~ to its probable future "false alarm rate" may arise, and precautionary measures taken by Allies and opponents.

To guard the source of its special information, elite may even be forced to take actions counter-indicating their possession of it. (This may arise when the data-differential refers to the existence of detailed plans or covert objectives. Note Nixon dilemma when JFK proposed aiding invasion of Cuba; ~~in~~ dilemma when Stevenson proposed stopping tests?)

MAGIC and Pearl Harbor.

3. Different impact of negative and positive results from photos.  
Distinguish between photos that negate other evidence--as when photos show definitely that there are no missiles on a particular site, contrary to specific reports--and photos that fail to confirm & other evidence or to point in the same direction--as when photos failed to show that missiles were being dismantled, or showed conflicting indications.

Is it generally true that negative evidence from photos, or even failure to confirm other evidence, is given more weight at high levels than at lower levels of analysis, or more weight than it should get? Or, are there circumstances in which this occurs?

Even where the photos strongly negate some specific hypothesis of interest, there may be other specific hypotheses, or broader hypotheses, almost as plausible a priori, which these photos simply fail to confirm (or even support). Proponents of the earlier, discredited hypotheses will be motivated to generate such alternatives: less hurt by this specific evidence, and perhaps less vulnerable to this form of test. This motivation may discredit the search operation; yet the hypotheses it turns up may be worthy of consideration.

E.g.; a) Should the Administration have been as confident as it was (?) in the adequacy of U-2 coverage prior to May, 1960? What does Cuba affair tell us about this? How about MREMs/IREMs?

b) How much confidence can be placed in photo evidence that all missiles were removed from Cuba?

c

Can there be "hard" evidence of a negative nature, except as relating to a highly specific hypothesis? Are photos that fail to show certain phenomena treated as being as "hard" as if they distinctly showed other phenomena?

*(are documents the "hard" evidence to the photos?)*

1 How explain that missiles were transported clandestinely, but not constructed covertly?

2 How does installation and operation of SAMs in Cuba compare with practice elsewhere when SAMs have been deployed? With Soviet practice?

Have they ever activated SAMs piecemeal?

3. What Was Sept. 10 flight cancelled because of Chinat shootdown?

4. What if Aug. 30 and Sept 8 U-2 incidents had occurred prior to Aug. 29;  
a) Would SAMs have been discovered so early?

b) In absence of flights, might collateral reports have caused more concern?  
e.g., in absence of evidence on SAMs, suggesting alternative explanation?

5. Is absence of recon, because of incidents or weather, reflected in planning or declaratory activity? (Or are planning activities geared to the expectation that recon will continue or proceed soon, with no adjustment for unexpected delays?)

6. Is there a tendency to react to information-flow as if it closely corresponded to flow of events being observed? E.g., to react to sudden exposure to data as if external events had moved rapidly (e.g., increase of info on missiles between 16 and 18 Oct ~~xxxx~~ because of increase in coverage; tendency to treat as if revealing crash activity? Sudden increases in identification of activities not previously covered or recognized; does this create crisis atmosphere? e.g., SA-2s after 29 Aug.; SA-2s in East Germany and SU)

Or does lack of newly confirming evidence create atmosphere that "nothing new is happening," even though lack may reflect absence of recon for weather or other reasons. Or, "something may be happening but there is no 'hard' evidence of it." E.g., Admin statements about missiles in period 5 Sept--14 Oct; or intell. statements about dismantling, 30 Oct--2 Nov.

xx

7. Who knew of emergence of SAM system on 26-27 Oct in US? How was it interpreted, at the time? Who analysed it for ExComm?

8. How might this have been related to shootdown of U-2 on 27 Oct? When, in what sequence, did news of this come in? How was it interpreted, in various stages, by various people?

9.. What evidence is there that SU considered concealment from high-alt photography possible?

10. Is there reason to believe that missiles did not come on ship prior to mid-Sept?

11. With what other Sov operations can this deployment be compared? What are differences, similarities: e.g., in secrecy, concurrency, site preparation, C&C, security, timing, manning? How much intelligence did we get out of it? Was this foreseeable by Sovs? (Was this reason for predicting Sovs wouldn't put base here?)

Southard: 21 April

Fomin told Scali, Sat morning (27 Oct) that K had not received reply from State before sending Sat. morning letter on Turkey-Cuba. This was blatantly untrue; Fomin got reply about 7:30-8 Friday night, must have sent it immediately, K would have had it about 12 hours before broadcast of Turkey letter.

((But: might Fomin know of a foulup in comm, or delay in transmitting to K at other end? Consider delays in Moscow--Washington. Might K have been unavailable? What was means of transmission from Russian Embassy in Washington? How does Hot Line change this?))

((Who knew of Scali deal Friday night: before ExComm meeting? Was ExComm told? Who knew by Saturday-Sunday? Did some see the Friday night letter without knowing of Scali; how did they interpret it? Who knew on Saturday that there had been a Friday night answer to Scali; in effect, an answer to the Friday night letter?)

What were beliefs of Ex Comm, President, as to whether K had received reply to Scali before sending Turkey letter?

Were other channels being used simultaneously: Dobrynin-RK, Dobrynin--Thompson, Kohler-Gromyko? (Pachter). Were British in circuit? Friday night? Saturday?

S. believes: K got Scali reply Friday night, and this reassured him that US, interested in negotiating this deal, was unlikely to take violent action immediately; K had time to try Turkey deal.

((But how about Scali emphasis on "little time"?))

Question then becomes: What changed his mind 24 hours after Turkey letter?

S. answer: the "signal of utmost alarm." (See Pachter)

((Were there other channels as well?

Was threat specific? Did it unequivocally go beyond increasing the blockade? Was it regarded by JFK as absolute commitment? What did he foresee as possible, probable responses? When exactly was it sent? Relation to concern over retaliation against Turkey?

Is it possible there was direct answer Saturday night? Might retali. against Turkey ever have been specifically threatened? (S. thinks not).

Why didn't K use more of period allowed? (Analogy: immediate turning back of ships after speech?)

((Why is signal held so tightly? Why are all private comms held quite so tightly? Has there been bad past experience on this?)

S. had not considered possibility that U-2 shootdown, if accident, might have frightened K. (Note Pachter: according to RK, it did determine JFK to increase recon and blockade. And...?)

((How would "signal" of dismantling Turk missiles have appeared in combination with this? ~~MANIA~~ Was this considered?)

Who on ExComm, others, knew of Signal?

So. 21 April 2.

Southard started study with assumption that ~~gaxxxhadxxat~~ the public record--and even the private record then available--did not support Administration claims of deliberate Sov deception; rather, that int. comm and Admin. had simply erred in their interpretations of Sov statements, had failed to see their emphasis on purposes, etc.

((Certainly Sept 11 statements and Gromyko statements lied in describing the role of the Sov "specialists"--and hence were extremely misleading.))

But S is now convinced that they were directly deceptive.  
((Does Dobrynin-Sorenson talk completely confirm this?))

S. Study started with a directive from McC to analyse what it was ((not, whether?)) that we had done that had led to K to believe that he could get away with it.

Rostow criticised that study emphasized what we had done rather than the pressures on K to do what he did (S thinks R. could not have read appendix, which goes into this); but S thinks that former is more pertinent to examine, from point of view of learning from experience. ((? May be misleading.))

Rostow points to his memo of Aug '62, pointing to pressures on K, and possibility that they might lead him to: 1) improve strategic balance; 2) put pressure on Berlin; or 3) increase Cuba as militant base. But 1 and 3 did not lead Rostow to predict missiles in Cuba; rather, his paper indicated building up Cuba as a base for subversion.

Question is: do even the combination of pressures and reassuring signals add up to a strong explanation of K action? I.e., granted that they make K action more probable than if they did not apply, do they make it highly probable, or more probable than not? ((and how do they weighx against the unreassuring signals, the disincentives : and the ~~inxxx~~ inertia of past Sov patterns?)) Note that both signals and incentives were known to us well before fall of 1962; why did they not lead to prediction of missiles? Should they have?

((It is a plausible hypothesis that int. comm. is inhibited from taking "reassuring signals" fully, explicitly, or realistically into account, either consciously or in published results.))

S. thinks that if he had been estimating on Cuba, he too would have predicted against missiles: possible but unlikely; because it would be irrational of Sovs to do it. ((Why? Is that still clear?))

Thus; his "explanation" still leaves action unlikely; he is forced to regard it as "irrational": impulsive, erratic, wishful, reckless.

((S. tends to emphasize: K probably gave more weight, wishfully, to reassuring signals than he should. He doesn't consider as much that K may have given more weight to incentives--considered situation more urgent, alternatives worse--than he "should." How about "last change" aspect? How about effect of recent improvement in balance?))

## Indecision Theory

Deciding - Postponing, Indeciding  
Rejecting

"Events decided for him":

His expectations as to his choice are definite — because Nature or someone has made other actions impossible or prohibiting costly.

"Decisions" action with consequences that can be traced to you; b) reveal your expectation or values.  
(i.e. can be right or wrong, moral or immoral)

"Decision not to produce... in 1958"

AFTER FIVE DAYS RETURN TO

1) Policies or Punishments,  
2) Conventions  
Isolation, Poverty, Negligence

Willy: 1952

Cuba problems: representative of future "war termination" problems; US-inspected arms control, trouble getting ground inspection, third party problems, verification problems...aerial recon.

Consider problems of terminating Big Limited Exchanges. (Role of third parties, UN?)

How to know when the war is over? (may have ended before bombs stop falling, or not have ended when they do). ((When are we in a "war"?))

May demand destruction of some weapons

Problem of interpreting arriving weapons as to intent: civil damage deliberate, inaccurate weapons, or ~~insecure~~ or poor C&C

Ambassador used to terminate his own accreditation with delivery of declaration of war.; now, his assignment might begin.

(B-52 not designed for landing with a full load of fuel, nor for jettisoning fuel....hence, reluctance to launch on false alarm difficult, of bringing back early...has B-52 a "minimum range", like a missile?)

Problems with strike: (26 Oct)

In favor of visible crescendo pointing towards strike: allows prior consultation with Allies; allows increasing pressure, leading to removal of missiles prior to strike.

In favor of generalized pressure not keyed to strike: preserves security, for military reasons; may forestall commitments by Khruschev (leading to Allied pressures).

Without Allied consultation, possible disunity, especially if strong response by K: contingency plans might not be executed.

But if leak: Cuban fighters and bombers alert; air defense knows where attack; could fire missiles; could launch bombers and fighters; give SU chance to regain initiative; gives Allies chance to talk US out of action; limited air plans need surprise for insurance.

Lags: S-40: WH announce continued buildup

S-12: Presidential order

tasks calling for communications: 1. Advise CINCEUR of possible alternatives, prepare to call alert, schedule notification of NATO govs; 2. Consult with UK, France, FRG; Ex (-40)

(-24; JCS say -12): military alerts.

-12) inform govs of UK, France, FRG of nature of operation (emissary)

-8: cable guidance to US Embassies in Europe

-6: notify Turkish and Italian Prime Ministers of possible SU counteraction

inform other NATO govs

S: notify Dobrynin; Ambassadorial rep at UN; LA Ambassadors; brief

Advantages:

1. Carries out President's pledge; avoids erosion of momentum and position; shows US will to fight and protect vital interests (cf Berlin).

2. keeps issue focussed on Su nuclear presence in Cuba in defiance of OAS and majority of Security Council. (directed at offensive veh)

3. Sharp, possible one time action, may carry smaller risk of further escalation than a series of confrontations over time.

4. Prompt action avoids danger of growth of nans-ofi-Cuba movement in LA; present willingness of LA to support strong action probably can't be continued indefinitely.

5. Signals clearly US not prepared to bargain bases in Cuba for positions in Berlin, NATO and elsewhere.

6. Demonstrate to Cubans, Castro and others the weakness of Su position in Cuba. In absence of strong K reaction, undermine Castro reliance on Su; weaken tendencies to rely on Su elsewhere.

7. removes a military threat to US from Cuban territory.

8. Denies K a possible cheap victory.

9. Pressure preceding strike may be sufficient to accomplish objective without execution of attack; especially if a suitable out variable to K and Castro

Thought: possibility of K riposte in Rina; remote possibility of firing w/ local so commander; adverse effect on US image on attack on small country, but good effect of will to take on Su; may not totally

## CUBA

Cuba shows importance of our being in a position to threaten credibly to take the initiative: i.e., to fire the first shot, if ~~xxxxxx~~ SU did not comply with our demands. Our credibility in this case lends credibility to similar threats w.r.t. Berlin; though their our ability to take initiative in same sense (in that casee, to break a Soviet blockade) is called into question by allies. Note advantage, when threatening to take violent action, of willingness to take unilateral action...so opponent isn't encouraged to hope that allies will hold us back, or to temporize while applying pressure to one or all of our allies. Same could apply in Berlin.

Note: only by acting immediately upon learning of SU move did we manage to present Soviet's action as "destroying the status quo." If we had lived with those missiles a bit longer--in particular, allowing all missiles to be delivered, sites to become operational, warheads installed, perhaps even Cuban operators trained (e.g., on SAM sites)--they would have become a new status quo, particularly if we had acquiesced in them for some interval, as we did with the "defensive" weapons. But while Soviet move is in progress--missiles still on the way, etc.--we can plausibly claim that no new status quo has been established (K seemed to appreciate this point; hence, extreme haste on SU part to install missiles). Likewise, while Berlin wall was still just a pile of bricks...

Deciding to move fast "next time" is no substitute for moving fast when initially confronted with provocation. ((Note Gilpatrick's remarks Sunday, on=importance of speed.)

Speed of response depended this time, as it did in Lebanon, Quemoy, etc, on the Navy (and Marines), which is our fastest-responding component (Wainstein). Berlin would be different in this respect. Analyze why others are slower; fix up.

Review the columnists, commentators. Grade them. Generalize, if possible, on relation of press reports to actual decision-making.

Extreme stability anticipated for early stages of escalation. We had signaled clearly limits of our move in Cuba. Then, if they had responded with attack on Turkish missiles, little danger that we would misinterpret as part of a larger attack. (In fact, we might have done nothing). Thus, an SU move that would usually be regarded as insanely dangerous for them, and hence unthinkable, might have been rendered "harmless-looking," or at least interpretable as limited, by its context, which might have included a similar move initiated by US. Compare: attack on Guantanamo, or CINCPAC HQ. As we contemplate initiatives by US, we should prepare for SU responses of a sort heretofore excluded as too destabilizing.

We were about to use HE; and expected them to use HE in reply; and would have used HE in counter-reply; all

Develop permissive within a comprehensive look at the whole safety structure, including alternative methods of achieving safety/responsiveness.

1. Cuban crisis not "maximum threat situation,"  
(SC non-alert; nuclear war threat minimal).
2. Alert alert during crisis:
  - a) detects attack on C+C
  - b) ties in RIS, provides visual confirmation of attack.
  - c) Provides data to decision-maker (whether) not available in SAC Alert.
  - d) Can have decision-maker far better for controlled response than SAC alt. (e.g., JCS, Deputies, CINCs + Plans).
  - e) In contrast to CINCs:
    - i) man to keep airborne, not 5 or 6 (or; keep one of them airborne, ~~and~~ though cost is the same;
    - ii) bring one of them — or JCS, i.e. — back to Rational plane (along with his POLAD).
  - f) ~~1~~ 1 plan for data; communications; staff; data-processing.
  - g)

Without this, virtually no basis for "controlled response" under minimum low-warning threat. ADDITIONAL SECDEF IS NOT TRYING TO SUPPORT IT.

3. Plan: ground alert plan for top decision-maker on most serious alarms. (prior to DODC — 67-70). + warning system.
4. Cuban IRBM threat vs. OS C+C system shows:
  - a) current vulnerability of C+C
  - b) possibility of unreported threat (e.g. subs in Cuba?)

15

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

- Is tactical nuclear threat more credible in face of counteraction — than massive retaliation?
- MR&M's not reversible.
- Don't put forward conditions under pressure to use their nuclears.
- If war is near, all the more reason it must not be bad strategy, must change fast.
- Teach K. that he has already provoked Type II response; mobilization; and that he can prove he more, as in 1950.

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[Want contingency plan that works adequately under many contingencies — not necessarily optimally — without "excessive" requirements for info; certainty, mobilization, first response.]

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2

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

- No weapons to France, Germany.  
(bring troops helps this).
- Can U-2 get through?  
Back-up info plan?
- Must hold allies together  
(US decisiveness + determination does play a role here).  
Remember objective.
- May be best time to commit in SE Asia;  
permit SO to put on heat there at will,  
by varying their commitment.
- Harassment in Cuba is of negative value.  
Only possibly desired measure worth considering.  
~~Attack~~
- This is not opportunity for military to take over, get  
unlimited & unsupervised funds, get all the hot  
programs.

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3

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- Don't adopt program that will annoy US  
contraction that it is SU that is aggressive,  
provocative. (e.g. arms test?)

Actions should be ostensibly related to this  
challenge by SU.

- Withdraw dependents? Look like preparation for  
US pullout? (Instead, try to withdraw  
first if hostilities spread).

- Don't just set US + Allies up for softening,  
by exaggerating likelihood of big war (e.g. by  
pulling out civilians). Back up deterrence, but  
show confidence in it (to stiffen US + Allied  
public reaction).

- List of "quiet" + "noisy" measures?

- Some crises, war, high level political decision:

- Improve State Of Alert — JCS coordination.

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## OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

- Consider political constraints on ability to "revoke" measures. (e.g. MRBM).
- Consider SC counteractions, accompanying actions.
- Crisis could be extremely beneficial, or disastrous.

A 9407

might result in serious damage owing to poss. of  
accidental detonation.

3) aerial raid against Turkish Ts would be  
event of quite different magnitude from penetration  
of perimeter of US-21, where main body of the  
strat. det. is based.

Provide flat US command that a nuclear attack by SU  
would be regarded as general assault on NATO +  
would require immediate retal.

Have NA Council recommend the disarming of the  
fighters, with US avoiding the initiative, but giving  
concessions as custodian of the weapons.

Recommend as another of highest urgency, Hawk to be  
installed in Turkey to protect.

14 Nov to Foreign Service at Paris NATO meeting, Dec:

(memo)  
approx. statement: If we had been forced to strike  
SU missiles in Cuba, we thought it probable that SU  
would have hit RBSMs in Turkey. We thought that our  
action to protect our security in the Caribbean might have  
resulted in an attack on our Ally was a considerable  
constraint on our actions.

[MEN in Pentagon: fear of SU reaction against Turkey

was a considerable deterrent to US strike — to MEN, or  
to others? (On Oct 27, MEN was in favor of temporary  
dismantling of Turkish missiles, then strike. What reason to  
believe this would have reduced prob of SU strike? What  
relevance would current operational status of RBSMs have had  
to SU? What reason to believe — intel? — that SU had  
any idea of hitting Turkish RBSMs? Would this have been  
consistent with SU behavior? → need to reexamine Cuban  
missile base analysis, need to reexamine position  
clarification.]

ithin 60T, 50I:

[vulnerable to converge on attack. If such an attack could have the greatest consequences since it would require an immediate response with appropriate countermeasures. It is the potential for escalation resulting from the existence of a relatively ineffective system which presents a vulnerable + tempting system target] which we should seek to avoid if we can find an alternative weapon system which better meets our military needs. This is especially true since we must continue to anticipate SC stimulated crises of comparable or even greater intensity to this night occur at any time over Berlin.

Brackets deleted from sub: It is questionable whether they would survive a limited surprise attack. Such a system today promises to be relatively ineffective? and it presents a vulnerable + tempting target — conditions...

[Why change? Is additional possibility of SC attack, or  
not wanted to emphasize escalation even more  
necessity for response? Ans. I am wanted to delete "lightning rod" nations.

World Justice would be equally "under pressure, exposed"  
in a crisis where SC was provoking reg., as in Berlin?

First Jet F-100 aged (13 planes) ready 1 July 62;

2d aged ready 30 Nov 62. Weapons forward

further  
NSAM 143 on dispensal of bombs to Turkey.

B-52 bombs round to Turkey; then CG USAF has informed cover

Turkey grants: 2, USAF mat squad at Izmir on rotation

PAL - probably used it can insure against unauthorized use

for a period of at least 2 hours. But will not be available

till July 62 and the only way for those bombs actually

hung on QRA aircraft.

Could keep in storage sites till PAL installed, but

others, three, have QRA aircraft with bombs, without PAL.

Without PAL, Jets could probably use weapons, even

with non US custodians. Capability for US custodians

to immediately destroy weapons if unauthorized user appeared

unit. Capability does not now exist, nor is it planned.

[Check at Linnane].

Pres advanced required before bombs can be dispensed

to Turkey.

Points:

1. U.S. may be forced to take offensive action against Cuba; Russia may react somewhere.
2. K. has deliberately chosen to link the missiles in Cuba with the missiles in Turkey, on the basis of contiguity to respective homelands; we must consider the possibility that he would regard suitable retaliation as being against IRBMs in Turkey, presumably with non-nuclear attack.
3. We do not intend to concede, by word or action, the validity of K's analogy; nor are we willing to act in any way upon the notion of a "trade" between <sup>Soviet</sup> missiles aimed at the Western Hemisphere and NATO missiles <sup>in Europe</sup> pledged to the support of the NATO Alliance.

21 Oct

Aspects of withdrawal of missiles from Turkey which may, in some respect be favorable--or not gravely unfavorable--to our national interest:

- a. It would provide a basic formula by which we may remove a short range nuclear threat to the US.
- b. It would offer a possible mechanism, if properly handled, for exhibiting that the Cubans--and the Russians in Cuba--have been induced to withdraw from a position of considerable advantage.
- c. Could be made to portray the US in the eyes of the American States, as having been successful in abating an immediate nuclear threat to the Americas and in impeding the growth of Castro's power.
- d. Were it to render a landing attack unnecessary it would thereby avoid the inevitable casualties and expenditure of treasure characteristic of an assault operation.
- e. It would exhibit negotiatorial flexibility, reasonableness and a deep desire for peace on our part.
- f. Our total nuclear posture with respect to metropolitan Russia would not be degraded in a decisive, or even in a major degree.

Aspects of withdrawal which would be unfavorable to our national interest:

- a. NATO. The alliance derives its strength from balanced quantities of power (largely US nuclear power) and good faith. In this case, a small reduction in the former may well destroy the latter. The NATO nations which have exposed themselves to Russian threats by permitting the installation of our nuclear weapons on their soil cannot regard lightly a chess game such as this.
- b. Turkey. The Turks are doubly valuable allies--immediately contiguous to our enemy and steadfast in their allegiance, they are deserving of our strongest support. Turkish soldiers are manning the Jupiter missiles--not U.S. soldiers. Removal of the weapons, in the most real sense, is an act of disarming our friend.
- c. CENTO. Removal of this focus of nuclear ...
- d. Precedent. The capitulation to a Russian blackmail formula in Turkey can only encourage its application elsewhere--in Europe, in Asia and in the Americas. Having worked effectively in Cuba, there is no assurance, should the Communists prevail in Guatemala, that it will not be repeated there, and then the blackmail cycle resumed.
- e. Verification. In the last analysis, we must reflect upon our unhappy experiences in verifying the extent to which the Communists have kept their word in the past. The mobile missiles in Cuba can be hidden--and probably would be, and the amount of surveillance or inspection which they could be expected to tolerate from us would not give the US any real assurance that the bargain was being kept.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

~~SECRET~~

Norstand Dec. 3 fast removal would have very bad effects on alliance. Would give rise to belief in low-US secret deal. Coverage already inadequate of IRBM's - MRBM's. Only 1 month covering each 50 sites, typically; some not covered (Prov. only, not covered). Lower damage expected on <sup>50</sup>MRBM's than for ICBMs; thus, not true that they are targeted with same priority as threat to ZI (i.e. with early arrivals; missiles). Also, some covered with IDors, being phased out. As Op 5, most left uncovered (targets shift).

Even 3 Polaris would not compensate, given penalties a time on station [however, would be better in 2d strike; but targeting?]

Le

Notes to Italy. 8. Oct 9, Oct 28, 1959.

Agreed US would provide IRBM and would transfer title, Training assistance & support for 5 years from deployment.

Upon deployment, missiles will be considered in the Turkish Armed Forces committed to NATO and legal title will be transferred to effect. later in the future.

Warheads will remain US property; will be provided from NATO stockpile

Agreement will remain in force for full period of NATO treaty (w.r.t. Turkey US).

Abandoning by US of unilateral right to withdraw warheads would violate spirit of agreement, if not letter (not expressly treated).

Don't know yet whether title transferred; but  
to deactivation  
count of 207 required anyway. If they count, US could  
demand return of missiles (as no longer required for original purpose).

[Title transferred to Italy on deployment.

Questions for McNamara

1. Fever chart of expectations, early August on.
2. Attitude to Sept 4 statement; reserve authority; Sept 13 statements. Was crisis necessary?
3. Evaluation of political implications, motives.
4. What if expectation of missiles had been somewhat higher?
5. Attitude to McCone's predictions.
6. Relative influence of: estimates; McCone; Sov statements; own evaluations; other "experts".
- 6<sub>1</sub>: Influence of U-2 incidents on Sept 10 decisions.
7. On first learning (when?): a) surprise; b) reaction; c) view of alternatives, considerations, payoffs, expectations;
8. Attitude on: immediate strike; warning; political route/trades; air strike after blockade; likelihood of K backdown. When did blockade--strike (threat) pattern emerge?
9. F-S, Friday night letter; interpretation. Saturday morning letter. Role in fashioning response. Interpretation of U-2 shootdown. Attitude on ~~miss~~ rendering IRBMs non-operational, removing them: Saturday night; Sunday.
10. Importance of getting missiles out; importance of method; why? Military vs. political motives.
11. Who did early calculations on requirements for air strike, effects? How close was Pres to that? What would have triggered it?
12. What if K hadn't backed down, or shot more planes, Sunday morning?
13. Was blockade/preparation for strike seen as likely to get missiles out? What hopes for ultimatum?
14. Specific basis for fear of retaliation against Turkey; probability?

Questions for McGeorge Bundy

1. Fever chart of expectations, concerns.
2. Relative influence on expectations of: various Sov statements; Sept 28 letter; Sept 11 statement; McCone; estimates; high-level Sovietologists; own appreciation of Sov goals, perceptions, tactics.
3. Most influential "deception". Private channel mentioned by JFK. Any little-known Sov statements on deception; on their expectation that we would discover by recon; on their estimates? Conscious estimate of their willingness to deceive?
4. Why not more specific queries on private channel, or to Dobrynin?
5. Motives, expectations leading to Sept 4 statement? Relation to NSAM 181? Sept 13 warning? (How much deterrent; how much reassurance, on Sept 4; how much answer to political opposition?)  
What if expectation of MRBMs had been higher? e.g., if McCone had been around; if Sovs had introduced missiles elsewhere; if estimates had put higher?
6. Effect on later problems, responses, of these JFK warnings, commitments.
7. Personal response to news: surprise, emotion, interpretation, view of responses. Had suspicion been growing? Who did McG tell? What did he do, think about?
8. President's response; above. Where was he Sunday night? ~~KHE~~
9. Reaction to deception; interpretation of Sov motives in deception?
10. What if: a) no deception; b) no Pres commitments (e.g., no Keating); c) Sovs had informed JFK: August; Pre-Sept statements; pre Oct 14; pre Oct 22? What if they told Allies;
11. What if Sovs had exploited SAMS or protest to stop U-2s? Role of incidents on Sept 10 meeting. What if missiles had been discovered earlier? Fear of incidents before election; effect of Debrynin Sept 6 reassurance?
12. What if missiles hadn't been found till they and SAMs were operational?
13. Distribution of Sept 28 letter. Interpretation; effect on later expectations (e.g., on Sov resistance to blockade; on Sov interference in Berlin.)
14. How close to immediate air strike? What would have triggered? How would it have come out?
15. Decision to focus on K/SU rather than Castro; who, when, why?
16. Decision to emphasize deception in private communications to K, then and later.
17. Sequence of attitudes on trades as means of getting missiles out; what was JCKK's desire on Saturday afternoon, evening. What arguments were decisive?
18. When would we have released word on Il-28s?
19. Why did K think he could get away with it? Why didn't he believe threats? Why didn't we pick up this possibility? What finally convinced him?

My dear friend: We are now in possession of incontrovertible military  
Letters to Macmillan, ~~de Gaulle et autres~~  
(drafted by Johnson)

~~SECRET//EXCERPT~~ evidence that the Sovs have already installed  
offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, and that some of these may  
already be operational. This constitutes a threat to the peace  
not only of this hemisphere but of the entire free world.

(to Mac: You will recall that last month I stated publicly that  
the Government of the US would consider the presence of ground-  
to-ground missiles in Cuba as an offensive threat. In response to  
my remarks, the Sovs stated that such armaments and military  
equipment as had been shipped by them to Cuba were exclusively  
of a defensive nature, and this was repeated to me only last Thursday  
by Gromyko under instructions.

The foregoing has created a highly critical situation which  
must be met promptly and fearlessly.

...I am quite clear in my mind that these missiles have got  
to be withdrawn,...

The object of the quarantine, which will be put into effect  
immediately, is to prevent the SU from introducing additional  
missiles into Cuba and to lead to the elimination of the  
missiles that are already in place.

...I need not point out to you the possible relation of this  
secret and dangerous move on the part of Khrushchev to Berlin.  
We must together be prepared for a time of testing.

...This is a solemn moment for our two countries, indeed for the fate  
of the entire world. It is essential that the already great dangers  
before us should not be increased through miscalculation or  
underestimating by the Soviets of what we intend to do, and are  
prepared to endure, in the face of the course on which they have  
so recklessly embarked.